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How Spontaneous? How Regulated?: The
Evolution of Property Rights Systems
Richard A. Epstein
ABSTRACT: The property rights literature has had an extensive debate over
the extent to which systems of property rights can be spontaneously generated
by custom and common practice, without the positive intervention of the state.
This Essay takes a divided view on that question, noting that these property
rights, often with uncertain stability, can be created when it is possible to
create a system of absolute priorities, as with land, or a system of proration,
as with riparian property rights. The simple definition of rights, easily known
and scalable, make this possible, so that government intervention, often
through statutes of frauds and recordation are used to improve the overall
stability, not to reconfigure those rights. More complicated systems—such as
those used for preserving fish wildlife, for creating prior appropriation of
water rights, pooling of oil and gas rights—require complex regulatory
interventions, which should be crafted in a form that seeks by using principles
of just compensation, the prior rights holders under simpler legal regimes.
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INTRODUCTION

There has been a longstanding debate in the judicial and academic
literature about the role of custom and law in the formation of various
property rights systems. For these purposes, I shall stress the opposition
between custom and law, and not their similarities, which is consistent with
my focus on the early emergence of property rights systems. With regard to
their differences, it is best to think of custom in its earliest sense, where it
functions as an application of general natural law principles, a phrase that is
not in entirely in good order today. The point of this stipulation is not to
resolve a longstanding debate on whether natural law conforms to reason or
to common practice, both within and across social settings. Instead, it is quite
sufficient to say that these two approaches are mutually reinforcing in the
broad run of cases, such that the emergence of a rule that responds to both
imperatives enjoys an extra measure of permanence and legitimacy.
What then, for these purposes, is “natural law”? In this discussion, I use
the phrase to address two issues. The first treats natural law as a mode for
creation of legal rights and duties. The second is a powerful but often
underappreciated feature of natural law rules: under a natural law system, the
state cannot become the titleholder to any form of property, for the simple
reason that there is no organized state in a state of nature.
Starting with the former, the emphasis is on the mode of creation, and
not its legal or ethical content. The term “natural law” is intended to highlight
the simple proposition that these “prepolitical” rights and duties develop
prior to the formation of a formal state, which, in its Austinian1 and Weberian2
sense, exercises a monopoly of force within the jurisdiction. The norms that
emerge are decentralized, both in their creation and enforcement. Down the
road these norms help legitimize the transition to a territorial state, which
need not rise to the size and complexity of the modern nation state, but also
encompass smaller city states that have defensible borders marked by
defensive walls.
Within these newly emergent states, legal actors can consciously adopt
and ratify substantive norms that have already achieved a fair measure of
community durability and legitimacy. Durability is relatively easy to measure,
by looking at the period that a particular norm has lasted, subject to, as will
always be the case, small incremental adjustments at the edges. Legitimacy is

1. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, at vii (1832) (“Laws
proper or properly so called, are commands: laws which are not commands, are laws improper
or improperly so called.”). See generally HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
(Anders Wedberg trans., Russell & Russell 1961) (1945).
2. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 54 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1968)
(1922) (stating that an organization or group counts as “a ‘state’ insofar as its administrative staff
successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force [das Monopol
legitimen physischen Zwanges] in the enforcement of its order”). This definition obviously does
not take into account the complications of a federalist system.
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always more difficult to assess, but for these purposes, it is established by
satisfying the following simple condition: the loser in a particular dispute is
willing to accept the outcome because he respects the decisional process and
thus regards the norms it produces as working in his long-run interest.3
Any such situation is likely to prove stable so long as, for the disappointed
litigant, the long-term gains from continuing in the practice exceed the shortterm losses in a particular dispute.4 That disappointed litigant (or his allies)
could form that last judgment from either selfish or benevolent reasons. That
actor could think that the loss in one case will lead to victories in future
disputes, or will lead, alternatively, to higher overall levels of output, which,
going forward, he will share with other members of that community. Given
that we are in pre-state mode, the communities in question are often tribes or
clans. Accordingly, any given actor has affective ties to a large fraction of
individuals with whom he repeatedly interacts, measured by a shared genetic
inheritance, which reduces, but does not eliminate, conflicts of interest.5 For
these purposes, the exact mixture of the influence of moral judgment and
pragmatic self-interest does not matter, assuming that these two forces can be
disconnected. What does matter is that the emergent customs and practices
in the state of nature cannot be treated as a consequence of conscious
deliberation and supervision by the state.
The second distinctive feature of natural law is that the state cannot be a
rights holder of any resource, for the simple reason that there is no state at
all. At this point there are two options for resource control. By the first,
resources can be said to be res commune, which means that these are subject to
an open access regime. The key text in regard to this position comes from
Justinian, who writes: “Thus, the following things are by natural law the law
common to [mankind]—the air, running water, the sea, and consequently
the sea-shores.”6 The consequence of treating these resources as res commune
is that no person who abides by the rules can be denied access to these
common resources. But it is critical to note that these resources are not owned
by anyone, and, furthermore, that they can never be reduced to private
ownership by individual actions, including damming or diverting a river.
Therefore, the typical effort to locate the public trust doctrine in this passage
is historically misguided because that doctrine rests on the notion of a
political sovereign—one with duties to manage these assets for its citizens—

3. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and
History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1992), addressing these practices in the
context of contract and tort litigation.
4. See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
5. See W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour. I, 7 J. THEORETICAL
BIOLOGY 1, 1–8 (1964).
6. J. INST. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans., Oxford Clarendon Press 5th ed. 1913).
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who plays no part in the natural law system.7 By the same token, on the other
side of the line lie those things that are not held in common, but rather are
res nullius: things owned by no one, which can be reduced to ownership by
occupation (for land) or by capture (for animals and chattels).8 Once again
the creation of ownership requires no state involvement for its completion,
and thus qualifies as a natural law doctrine in the sense used here.
In contrast with both modes of natural law acquisition lie those formal
interventions that require the existence of a formal state that exhibits some
combination of legislative, executive, and judicial power. In these situations,
the common law in its formative stages is likely to exhibit properties that are
derived from the customary law on which it builds. A wise judge will seek some
good warrant to dislodge older rules, given the heavy costs of transition. But
even the most judge-centered system incorporates statutory interventions,
which include such notable private law standbys as statutes of limitation and
the statute of frauds, both of which are intended to facilitate and strengthen
the private law relationships governed by the rules of property, contract, and
tort that are developed under the natural law, and do not resemble in the
slightest conscious social planning. The question then arises, how do these
natural law customs and practices emerge, and what are their substantive
content? The issue is not only important in a state of nature. A similar
mechanism is often at work in modern informal norms that are not the subject
of direct legal enforcement, where the small stakes and the expressed desires
of the parties preclude any legal involvement.
II. A SPARE SET OF TOOLS
The initial challenge to any natural law system for the emergence of
property rights is the limited number of tools at its disposal. This is a matter
of special concern in property rights, because they are intended to bind the
rest of the world, and thus cannot depend on specific and repetitive
interactions between a small class of individuals with a close working
relationship with each other, as often happens in particular trades or
industries, where denser understandings may arise from custom or from a
repeated course of dealing. Indeed, in looking at the basic setup for property
rights, it is best to start with two basic permutations, after which it is possible
to add in further refinements.
The basic point here is that any property rights system in the state of
nature necessarily has to commit itself to one of two strategies: single priority

7. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (in bank)
(“From this origin in Roman law, the English common law evolved the concept of the public
trust, under which the sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath
them ‘as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.’’”). The word “evolved” conceals
all the important changes that have to be made to move from the open system of natural law to
the modern public trust doctrine.
8. G. INST. 2.66 (Edward Moste trans., 1904); J. INST. 2.1.12.
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or pro rata division. The first strategy involves a set of strict priorities on a
winner-takes-all basis, without any division of the spoils. Under this view, it is
only possible for either A or B to own the property in question. It is not
possible to have a priority in limited amount, such as exists—and this point
will become crucial—with respect to a single asset after which others are
entitled to their share of the take. Put otherwise, so simple a device as a
mortgage, let alone a set of mortgages, is not possible under this scheme. The
second strategy veers in the opposite direction, insofar as it relies on a pro
rata scheme that gives no one any temporal priority over any one else. To refer
again to the credit situation, the pro rata rule is one that treats all general
creditors with equal standing, regardless of the time that they acquired or
perfected their claim. For all of their obvious differences, both rules present
clear metrics that are easily observed, which reduces the cost of their creation
and enforcement in any informal community.
The next step is to match the particular form of entitlement with
particular cases. In dealing with this issue, the earliest resources of note were
movables, land, and water. The early emergence of property rights systems
began with the movables, which were the chief permanent possessions that
people had in hunter-gatherer communities, which by definition did not lay
down any fixed roots in any given territory.9 Before the rise of agriculture, the
basic economic calculations were as follows. Any effort to set down roots (the
phrase is used literally here) is costly because it requires clearing land for
cultivation and defending a set of fixed borders against all intruders. Hunting
and gathering, however, will be quickly exhausted in any one spot, so that
groups and tribes will have to remain on the move in order to replenish their
limited resources. The communities, moreover, have to be kept small enough
to allow for rapid deployment, but large enough to allow them to organize in
self-defense or, all too often, attack. It therefore makes no sense to stake
permanent claims in land when those claims provide no permanent value,
which is why these interests are sometimes described as “usufructuary,” i.e.,
pertaining only to the use and fruits. One partial qualification involves
primitive tribes that use a cave, for example, as a base of operations for some
defined period of time. These will be defended exclusively for that duration,
and in time may be the source of transition to the territorial state.
Movables are, by definition, a different case, and for these some
exclusivity is surely needed. Even here the movables may be common property
of some members of the group, which then requires a complex division of
divided control within a tighter group—the larger clan versus the nuclear
family. At this point, there is an instructive intersection between the rule of
individual acquisition through first possession and the sharing norms that
allocate those resources, once acquired, among various members of the group

9. For discussion, see Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
73, 87 (1985).
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or subgroup. It is highly likely that any individual acquirer could escape
familial or clan obligations, even for those forms of property that were
individually acquired. The point is important because it indicates that
elements of constrained redistribution of wealth constitute an early and
important feature of primitive life. But by the same token it is highly unlikely
that any of these rights could develop through common law type actions that
feature suits between two, or very few, private individuals. Indeed, to this day,
private lawsuits are never used to support these obligations. Within the private
law, these are said to rest on “imperfect obligations” that rely on conscience
and social pressures for their enforcement.10 Within modern law, they are
almost always imposed by statute as a charge on the general state, which is not
possible under state of nature theory. Apart from noting the lack of extended
discussion of redistribution in connection with private rights of action, I shall
not discuss this topic more here.
This basic scheme fits very neatly into the Lockean version of the labor
theory of value, which specifies that individuals as of right own their own labor
and are entitled to gain ownership of those things with which they mix their
labor. That last term, “mix,” has given rise to unnecessary confusion because
it suggests that much work has to be done to perfect a title that is previously
inchoate, thereby creating a lengthy and risky transitional period. But as
Locke then quickly explains, taking the acorn into possession is all that is
needed to reduce it to ownership, and thus to use or consume it, even by the
addition of labor.11 The norms of this system can be self-administered, and
require no external force to prop them up. Thus for land it is possible for the
owner to mark the boundaries of his or her possession in ways that give notice
to the world, wholly without recourse to any public registry. The same is not
true, for example, with the well-established property rights in copyrights and
patents, which necessarily require some government agency to define the
scope of the right and to establish some registry to give notice of the claims to
the rest of the world. Trade secrets, in contrast, do not require (and indeed
consciously avoid) any such form of public registry and thus qualify as natural
rights within this typology.
As a resource, land works far better under exclusive ownership than it
does under the open regime that proves more attractive for water. Hence land
acquisition follows a strict priority system: prior in tempore is potior in iuris, or
prior in time is higher in right. There is no sharing rule in this case, so
oftentimes this rule results in the outcome of first come, first served. This rule
is ideal for forming a focal point equilibrium because it allows a single owner
to give notice to the rest of the world to keep off, and then to rely on the
10. For an early discussion, see Joseph Story, Natural Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 151–53
(Francis Lieber ed., 1843), reprinted in JOSEPH STORY, JOSEPH STORY AND THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA
122–23 (2006).
11. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306–07 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1970) (1689).
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advantages of having the inside position to ward off attacks from others. Since
in general it is easier to defend than to attack, the outcome can be an uneasy
truce so long as the relative strengths of the parties are not too
disproportionate, so that one thinks that it can conquer the other. Moreover,
the first come, first served rule does not preclude others from taking
possession of other properties nearby, so that the decentralized control lays
the basis for a diffusion of political power.
The principle in question, moreover, not only applies to any dispute
between the first possessor and the subsequent takers, but is also a complete
rule in the sense that, even if the original possessor is out of the picture, it
applies to any conflict by giving any earlier taker a clear priority over any
subsequent one. The point is then hammered home by rejecting the ius tertii
defense—if C dispossesses B, he cannot defend that action by appealing to
the position of A. At this point, there are no lacunae within the hierarchy of
rights that could lead to the instability that arises whenever the law creates or
tolerates a void in the system of ownership that no one is allowed to fill. The
system meets the demands of natural law because the entire operation does
not require state intervention to define the property rights that are so
acquired.
Moving on, it is possible to adopt a similar natural law regime for the
capture of animals, where again a first possession rule works, but with this
modification: animals have wills of their own, and they will do what they can
to elude capture. So whether hot pursuit, wounding, or actual capture is
needed to perfect title becomes an issue. In most cases, the choice of rule will
not matter because the party who initiates the chase is likely to first wound
and then capture the animal.12 But in cases where there is conflict, there is
the well-known difference of views in Pierson v. Post—between Judges
Tompkins and Livingston—where the former opts for formal rules derived
from jurisprudence principles and the latter assumes that the custom of the
hunt (which was said to follow a hot-pursuit rule) should prevail.13
This particular dispute leads to the following general response. It may
well be that as between strangers, the simple fact of initial possession should
dominate, because it leads to a situation where private force is unnecessary to
dislodge a particular thing from another person. But where customs are
embedded in a larger community, with repeat players, the customary rule may
be preferable because it avoids all sorts of “tumults” that come as two (or
more) men on horseback head on a collision course with their rivals.
The customary rules on acquisition are, moreover, often highly animal
specific. Accordingly, the allocation rules for captured fin-back whales, where
direct collisions are unlikely, take a very different form to reflect the
contributions of two or more parties. As was well stated in Ghen v. Rich, the law

12.
13.

Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1224–25 (1979).
See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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will respect a local custom that provides a small reward to the finder of a
beached whale.14 A stable equilibrium arises because a party receives a return
for his respective labor that is greater than his anticipated cost, with an effort
to measure the reward in accordance with the level of investment. If the finder
could keep the whale and its sperm oil, no hunting would take place. If the
finder did not get compensated, the whales would rot on the beach. The
custom answers the question of sequential performance by parties in
asymmetrical positions.
Any system of ownership also has to allow for the possibility of transfer
from one person to another. These transfers can take two forms. The first
form is an outright transfer from one party to another, so that the transferee
becomes the exclusive owner against all, including the transferor. The second
form of transfer is far more complex because it allows for the division of
control between two (or more) parties along one of two dimensions. The first
is that of concurrent ownership, whereby the original owner retains some
interest in transferred property, which is now subject to divided interests. The
second is sequential ownership, where a given thing passes from hand to hand
in accordance with some pre-established timetable. Clearly the two forms can
be combined to create still more complex capital structures, with both
concurrent and consecutive claims.
Within the natural law tradition, both forms of transfer can be
accomplished by a simple delivery with an intention to pass ownership. But
even in the simplest case, to evidence intention to pass ownership (as opposed
to a loan or license) the transferor must express that intention. The situation
becomes still more complicated with the full range of divided interests in
property because possession alone does not, and cannot, reveal adequate
information about the state of the title. In these cases, it is possible within a
natural law tradition to develop private formalities that clarify when a transfer
takes place and its specific terms. But these are limited in their ability to give
notice to outside parties as to the state of the title. It follows therefore that
early systems tended to impose limitations—the so-called numerus clausus—on
the kinds of partial interests that could be created by deed or will in land, in
order to reduce the search burden on outsiders to the title who wanted either
to buy from or lend to its current owner(s). This difficulty of searching can be
reduced by introducing a state-run recordation system, which must necessarily
operate as a single index. In other words, the state creates a local monopoly
to which all must have access, so that potential buyers or lenders know where
to look to determine the state of the title. It is also then necessary to develop
a remedial structure that allows each party to protect its own interest against
14. Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 160–62 (D. Mass. 1881). For a more detailed discussion of these
rules, see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 211–13 (Paulo J.S. Pereira & Diego M.
Beltran eds., 2011) (1881); Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence
from the Whaling Industry 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, From Natural Law to
Social Welfare: Theoretical Principles and Practical Applications, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1743, 1750–52 (2015).
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the others, and for both parties together to gain protection against outsiders,
itself a long and complex legal tale.15 Historically, the most controversial step
of this system was the first: why do the unilateral actions of one person create
rights to a given thing that are good against the rest of the world? The
common philosophical criticism disparages a system where there is, to use the
evocative term of Richard Schlatter, the ability “to grab.” Under this system it
was claimed that eventually “everything would . . . pass into private ownership,
and the equal right to grab would cease to have any practical value.”16
There are two replies to this criticism. The first is that Schlatter is
incautious insofar as he assumes that the first possession rule applies to all
forms of property when, as the discussion of the res commune reveals, it does
not. Indeed, it misses the extensive obligation that a single or group of first
possessors have toward their family grouping, with its implicit element of
redistribution.
Second, to reject this rule for its egoistic implications requires that the
critic propose a substitute rule that will do as well if this rule is rejected. Most
critically, that proposal must do as well or better in state of nature settings,
which lack any centralized authority to organize or structure transactions. The
most common suggestion, often attributed to the late Ronald Dworkin, is to
organize, with clamshells perhaps, some kind of auction that allocates
property in ways such that each person under the system is happy with his
holdings relative to those that others get under this system.17 But the
institutional constraints of a state of nature make it impossible to organize this
auction in that setting.
The least of the problems is that clamshells in nature are not fungible,
for that issue could be overcome by creating private moneys, to obviate the
need for barter, which in general requires an advanced stage of social
development in which an exchange economy between strangers is already
developed. The more serious issue is that any centralized system of allocation
requires a government that can exert the monopoly power that defines the
Weberian state. It also requires a means to identify who counts as a relevant
bidder for the auction and articulated rules to determine the metes and
bounds of the land to be auctioned off. The details of any auction protocol
cannot be constructed in a state of nature, which is why the first possession
rule dominates in practice, even as it is rejected in much modern
philosophical theory. Ironically, what is regarded philosophically as its

15. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Possession and Licenses: The FCC, Weak Spectrum
Rights and the LightSquared Debacle, in LAW AND ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 237 (Yun-chien Chang
ed., 2015).
16. RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 131 (1951). For
criticism in a similar vein, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS (1977).
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY
65–71 (2000).
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greatest detriment—the ability of unilateral acts to generate claims that are
good against the world—is its greatest advantage. One person can pull the
deal off, so that the (imperfect) checks in the system come from the parallel
actions of others with nearby plots of land, not with formal checks on the
amount that can be occupied and held against all others.
It follows, therefore, that there is no reason to accept either of the two
standard theories that were put forward to justify the rule.18 The first of these
theories is the implied consent of mankind, a useful fiction that encapsulates
the view that the actions in question, if repeated by others, tend to create
overall improvements, to which all should (rationally) consent. The second is
that there is some special metaphysical link between the person and the thing,
which generates the claim of right by the fact of occupation. Blackstone
refuses to choose between the two theories, perhaps because both are wrong.
There is no strong and necessary claim that comes from this position. It is just
that the alternatives are worse. The overall situation looks not just at the
actions of a single person with respect to a single plot of land, but to the
overall system when many are allowed the same option. The stability of
possession allows for cultivation, construction, and sale, and so counts as an
improvement over the state of nature where no long-term investments are, as
Blackstone notes, precarious.19 So who gets what turns out, systematically, to
be less important than the idea that everything can have an owner even in the
absence of a centralized authority.
The second objection to Schlatter’s position is equally telling. The
standard philosophical critiques of the occupation rules fall because they do
not consider the settings in which common ownership applies. Implicit in the
“grab” theory is that both water and land can be reduced to private ownership
in the same fashion. Take a plot of land and it is yours. Stick a cup in the river,
and the water you draw out is yours as well. Nonetheless, that hasty conclusion
ignores the partial adoption of common property regimes with respect to
water, which in equilibrium had a mix of collective and separate ownerships.
The reason for res commune was with respect to the small, stable, and gentle
English streams—it did not take deep knowledge of water sciences to
conclude that a flowing river was worth more than the entire river water was
worth in the barrel. Hence a negative customary rule that prevented the

18.

The rules go back to Blackstone, who reports the controversy as follows:
Grotius and Puffendorf insisting, that this right of occupancy is founded on a tacit
and implied assent of all mankind, that the first occupant should become the owner;
and Barbeyrac, Titius, Mr. Locke, and others, holding, that there is no such implied
assent, neither is it necessary that there should be; for that the very act of occupancy,
alone, being a degree of bodily labour, is, from a principle of natural justice, without
any consent or compact, sufficient of itself to gain a title. A dispute that savours too
much of nice and scholastic refinement.

2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8.
19. Id. at *7.
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diversion of the river into private hands, one that could easily be deduced and
enforced on natural law principles, formed the appropriate baseline against
which future adjustments in rights over water could be judged.
The way in which this is commonly expressed in the Anglo-American law
is that the riparian owners who occupy land next to the river have only a
“usufructuary” interest in the water. The usufruct in classical Roman law was
best understood as an inalienable life estate in possession in real estate owned
by another called the “bare proprietor,” as a form of temporal division noted
above.20 This estate usually covered the right to consume the fruits and the
use of land, but not to destroy the principal that generated the fruits on the
land that was used.21 The term was imported into water law to signal that the
ability to remove and use water was subject to limitations that had to be
enforced in a natural law setting. The two sets of rules used to achieve this
result related first to flowing water, and second to the consumptive use of
water. On the first, the basic maxim opted for historical clarity to avoid the
fights needed to establish an alternative baseline. Hence on the initial point
the water in question had to continue to flow as it had previously flown. Aqua
currit et debet currere ut currere solebat [water runs and ought to run as it is
accustomed to run].22 That maxim did not receive specific support from
Blackstone, but instead worked its way into English law through the efforts of
Joseph Angell on Watercourses,23 after which it was incorporated into American
law, as one might expect, through the writings of Joseph Story and James Kent,
perhaps the two most preeminent legal American writers (both well respected
in England) of the first half of the 19th century.24 The point of this doctrine
is to make sure that the private uses of the river by riparians did not deplete
the value of a stream for its common uses of navigation, recreation, fishing
and the like.
It is a mistake in this context to work off the static model of John Locke,
which talks about requiring each person who takes water to leave “as much
again and as good” in the common pool. That doctrine gives rise to deep
skepticism that anyone can take out any water from a river, given that “as
much again” will not be left. But the maxim is wrong for two reasons. First,
many rivers are “increasing” streams, such that new water comes into the river
from a variety of sources. Those sources can offset some limited removals of
water from the river, without diminishing some supposed fixed supply of

20. For a brief account, see BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 145–47 (1962).
21. For further discussion, see generally Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in Water,
Spectrum, and Minerals, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 389 (2015).
22. For its use in modern American law, see Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 532–33 (Cal.
1966) (in bank).
23. See generally JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES (4th ed. 1850).
24. For the historical development of the maxim, see generally Samuel C. Wiel, Waters:
American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1919) (noting the French (and thus)
civil law influence).

EPSTEIN_PP_TO_ILR (DO NOT DELETE)

2352

6/28/2015 7:01 PM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:2341

water. The first task therefore is to make sure that the diversions from the
river do not exceed the point of destabilization. As a first approximation, it
makes sense that the withdrawal of water should not take it below its historical
levels, so as to make sure access to the stream is not compromised.25
Ideally, of course, it might be possible to find some better measure of the
collective use of water than the historical levels, but those inquiries tend to be
made only where preserving the water is of immense importance and the
deviations from the ideal standard have been so profound that some more
drastic intervention is necessary. Just that result was, for example, imposed on
the withdrawals from Mono Lake under the rubric of the public trust
doctrine, when wholesale diversion of the water from the Lake to Los Angeles
resulted in a precipitous drop in water levels that turned islands into
peninsulas that exposed isolated wildlife to dangers from a new set of
predators.26 In contrast, there was no need to invent a new baseline for Devil’s
Hole, a deep limestone cavern located in Nevada. In that setting, it was
sufficient to enjoin groundwater use by neighbors that took water levels below
the historical point needed for the Devil’s Hole pupfish to reproduce.27
The second set of rules concerns the division of the consumptive uses of
water from a river or lake among its potential takers. Here again, there are no
devices in a state of nature that let any government agency take direct control
over the water supply (which may well be a good thing). Instead some rule of
thumb has to be used to allocate quantities of water to rival claimants. In this
regard, the first doctrinal move restricts the consumptive use of water to
riparians, so that others who can make their way into a (navigable) river have
no right to take the water from it. Thus limiting the class of prospective
claimants makes it easier to impose common governance restraints.
Historically, it became quickly evident that water allocation in a riparian
system could not be done on a first come, first served basis, lest huge
quantities of water were consumed by riparians at the head of the river. The
reduced flow would leave little water to go down river, with a loss of collective
amenities and a shortchanging of the downstream riparians. By the same
token, upstream riparians could not be forced to sacrifice their draws to the
river for the sole benefit of the downstream users, less the imbalance be
allowed to run in the other direction.28
At the same time, it became clear that no priorities could be established
based on the time that given plots of riparian land were first occupied. Rivers
and lakes can have extensive frontage that make it hard to know about the
comings and goings of the various riparian claimants. Instead, the basic rule
25. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 283 S.W.2d 129 (Ark. 1955).
26. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983).
27. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1976).
28. See, e.g., Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420, 423 (1874) (noting sharp limitations on the
upper riparian “would give to the lower proprietor superior advantages over the upper, and in
many cases give him in effect a monopoly of the stream”).
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reverses the temporal priorities in land by adopting a rule of parity among all
riparians, which cuts out any incentive to engage in premature consumption
to establish a temporal priority. That rule is, moreover, similar to the rule that
allocates access to common utilities between early and late comers, and for
the same reason.29 The position is stated in florid terms that conceal its strong
economic logic: “‘The natural stream, existing by the bounty of Providence
for the benefit of the land through which it flows, is an incident annexed by
operation of law to the land itself,’ and ‘There may be, and there must be
allowed to all, of that which is common, a reasonable use.’”30 And further, “It
is not like the case of mere occupancy, where the first occupant takes by force
of his priority of occupancy.”31 These murky rationales notwithstanding, the
basic norm of common and reasonable use is the polar opposite to the
exclusive rights regime presumptively applicable to the ownership of land.
Nor is it difficult to supply functional explanations for this historical
outcome. Quite simply, no system of temporal priorities is workable. Often
times, variable flows make it difficult to predict how much water can be taken
out of a river at any given time. The parity of access leads to a parity of
reduction from some preexisting level.32 The clear analogy is to general
creditors who in bankruptcy share pro rata in the losses regardless of the time
that their claims matured. But for what amounts? With debts this is
straightforward because the loan amount is liquidated (an instructive word in
this context), making it easy to determine the relative portions. But there is
no such metric for water rights in the absence of any clear measure, so that
the priorities are determined by a hierarchy of use—domestic first,
agricultural next—again without state intervention.
It is also instructive to note how these riparian systems limit the alienation
of water rights.33 The riparian system has no direct measure of the water that
each riparian removes from the river. If that device was available, then it would
make sense to allow each to use or sell the water as he sees fit, just as with
other resources. But in this instance, selling the water separately from the
appurtenant land carries grave risks of overconsumption of water, which in
turn is countered by tying the alienation of water rights to the alienation of
the land. The system of free transfer that works for land is, at least in a natural
law system, heavily constrained.

29. State ex rel. Wood v. Consumers’ Gas Trust Co., 61 N.E. 674, 677 (Ind. 1901).
30. See Wiel, supra note 24, at 137 (referring to Story).
31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 979–82 (1985).
For a discussion of the pressures that build up on the system when use intensifies, see Mason
Gaffney, Economic Aspects of Water Resource Policy, 28 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 131, 137–41 (1969).
33. See, e.g., Little v. Kin, 644 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that, where
riparian land is subdivided, it is possible to create an easement for the benefit of rear owners so
long as the combined use does not exceed that before the land was subdivided).
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In a state of nature, therefore, water and land move in opposite orbits.
These rules, of course, only set presumptions, for there is nothing that says
that common ownership always works for water and private ownership always
works for land. Some sense of the complexity arises when local conditions call
for deviation. Thus, one rule that is common to (nonnavigable) lakes is that
access to the water is a limited commons for those who border on the lake,
but the division of the subsoil, so critical for mining operations, follows the
usual rules of exclusivity applicable to surface land.34 Thus, in general, any
riparian may have access to the full extent of the water, even if it is over the
soil owned by another. The full run of the lake produces higher benefits for
all relative to a system that confines owners to that portion of water located
over their private subsoil. It would be intolerable for a set of buoys to separate
the water. Yet, at the same time, if in a few cases a capacity constraint arises on
water usage, the proper allocation scheme prorates usage, not to the length
of the riparian border, but to the surface area of the underground land. At
the same time, creating paths around the edge of a closed lake may also be
common for all lake owners, subject to the implicit norm that only the owner
can camp out on his own portion of the land.
The rules for natural lakes should also apply to artificial lakes that come,
say, from filling up an abandoned quarry. Nonetheless, in one wellintentioned but misguided case, Alderson v. Fatlan, the court held that artificial
lakes do not follow the so-called civil law rule that allowed all owners to use
the entire lake, and thus permitted five owners to retaliate against lakefront
owners blockading the customary path around the lake at both ends of their
property.35 The correct solution goes in the opposite direction. It does not
matter that the new lake was created artificially. The effective allocation of the
path, the subsoil, and the water is exactly what it is for a natural lake. It was
instructive in that case that the customary circuit had quickly been accepted
in practice by all the original owners, and that the deviation came only from
one late-comer who bought their plot of land after the community norm had
been established, which should have bound (and benefitted) them all. The
court should have denied that both the lake and the surrounding path were
wholly private property, as both contained a common element that made for
their efficient deployment. Local customs often develop very rapidly when all
the players stand in reciprocal positions to one another, so that each derives
more benefit for the open use of the local path than from its division into six

34. See Johnson v. Seifert, 100 N.W.2d 689, 696–97 (Minn. 1960) (overruling Lamprey v.
Danz, 90 N.W. 578 (Minn. 1902), to hold that riparian owners bordering a lake have a right to
use the entire lake as long as it does not interfere with other owners). Doctrinally, the rights to
use the water are riparian, while the rights to mine minerals and the like are not.
35. Alderson v. Fatlan, 898 N.E.2d 595, 601 (Ill. 2008). My thanks to ROBERT W. ADLER,
ROBIN K. CRAIG & NOAH D. HALL, MODERN WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC RIGHTS, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS (2013), an excellent casebook that contains many of the cases
that have spurred my thinking on the subject.
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separate segments, even without an enforcement mechanism. But even
customary norms can be violated. By failing to recognize the right mix of
common and private property, the Illinois court achieved the worst of both
worlds: privatization of the water and privatization of the surrounding path.
The natural law regime still offers guidance in the most novel of modern
situations.
III. WHERE SPONTANEOUS ORDER FAILS
The previous Part illustrated the many contexts in which the faithful
exercise of natural law theory could produce reasonably sensible doctrinal
results. Within this framework there is still much room for government
intervention as a means to stabilize the rights in question by affording them
better transparency and greater enforcement. In these contexts, it can be said
that the creation of the state falls comfortably within the Lockean paradigm
under which the great end of government is for “the mutual preservation of
their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.”36
The passage of statutes of frauds (done in England just before John Locke
wrote his Second Treatise), statutes of limitations, and recordation systems
fall securely within this category. These all seek to lower the costs of voluntary
transactions in order to facilitate the efficient use of resources.
Yet it is quite clear that the creation of the state is not limited to these
ends, for in many cases, what is strictly needed is a transformation of property
rights from one legal regime to another. The problem here arises for a variety
of reasons, most of which have a single cause—namely, that the more
extensive exercise of traditional property rights produces outcomes that work
to no one’s long-term advantage, such that forcible reassignment of property
rights is needed to achieve some end unattainable through voluntary
transactions, given the number of parties involved. At this juncture, there is
always a two-stage progression. The first involves the introduction of a new
regime. The second involves the inevitable challenge that this state-induced
change results in a taking of private property without just compensation—an
inquiry that yields some surprising results.
A. WILDLIFE
One area that has cried out for specialized rules deals with animals, fish,
and birds. When the level of activity is low, there is usually no need to alter
the rule of capture. But as the activity level increases, the common-pool
problems assert themselves, and some bag limits are needed to offset the
excessive destruction from unlimited capture. These regimes cannot be
designed or enforced by natural law methods, but must rely on a specific
government design that determines the permissible levels of the catch and
allocates it to various players, where the differences in output can be huge
36.

LOCKE, supra note 11, at 368.
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depending on the particular scheme chosen.37 These systems also raise
implicit takings issues because it must be decided whether imposing the new
limitations will or should wipe out all previous entitlements. In my own view,
some effort should be made to avoid that by reserving some portion of the
new catch rights to individuals who previously participated in the capture of
the common resources, as a way to protect their earlier investments.38
B. OIL AND GAS
A similar problem in specifying property rights arises with the imposition
of various restraints on the production of oil and gas. The only natural law
prohibitions on drilling for oil and gas available under natural law theories
were prohibitions against slant drilling and malicious drilling. But owing to
the construction of oil and gas fields, this system led to excessive drilling that
dissipated the field. The cure required limits on the number of wells that
could be placed in some fields. The spacing regulations precluded some
landowners from drilling at all. The takings issue was whether they could also
be excluded from any share of the profits for oil located under their land, to
which in general the correct answer was no.39 Instead, each party derived a
share of the net profits equal to his contribution to the overall fields, after
bearing its pro rata share of the expenses needed to get the oil and gas out.
This result not only produced a regime of fairness between the parties, but it
also eased the complications of introducing the system in the first place. If it
is known that losers under any unitization will go home empty-handed, the
political jostling will begin as landowners each seek a plan that allows them to
continue their drilling operations, while suppressing that of their neighbors.
The compensation mechanism from pooling stabilizes the situation, for now
all landowners have an incentive to locate the wells in ways that optimize
production, so long as they receive their prorate share of the net profits.
C. WATER RIGHTS
A similar situation results from the intensification of use on water, only
here the problem is far more difficult to solve because of the multiple uses
that can be made of any river. One early way in which this problem manifests
itself is within the limitations of the res commune model of water rights,
especially in navigable rivers. The open access regime goes a long way to
ensure that all persons can gain access to public waters, but it does nothing to

37. R. Quentin Grafton, Dale Squires & Kevin J. Fox, Private Property and Economic Efficiency:
A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & ECON. 679, 709 (2000) (noting the high variation in
efficiency levels of alternative schemes of common-pool regulation of fisheries).
38. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 223–24 (1985) (discussing Rossmiller v. State, 89 N.W. 839 (Wis. 1902), which denied
preferences to individuals who cut and removed ice from public waters prior to the imposition
of a state regulatory scheme).
39. Id. at 219–23.
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ensure that the river will remain serviceable for navigation. As traffic gets
heavier, it may well be necessary to establish rules of the road, to mark safe
channels, to dredge or widen navigable passages, to remove obstacles from
the river, and to control pollution from all sources on land and within the
waterway. There is no single riparian who is in a position to effectively
undertake that task, so the water system transforms itself from a res commune
to one that has strong elements of government ownership and control. In
addition, the older natural law rule, which held that the owners of land on
either side of the river were the owners of the riverbed, also gave way, certainly
by the time of Blackstone, into one that passed the riverbed of a navigable
water into the hands of the state.40 The same is true in the United States,
where our federalist system complicates the overall situation by creating
divided authorities under which states own the beds of navigable river while
the control over navigation remains squarely in the hands of the federal
government.41
The transformation of that control over navigation to government
authorities is sufficient to overcome serious coordination problems to which
private parties cannot respond in a state of nature. One way to describe this
transformation is to say that the beds of navigable waters are held by the state
in public trust. In England that meant that the Crown held the property not
as part of its private wealth, but in the service of the people at large, and that
trust notion can easily transfer to American states. But exactly how does that
trust doctrine work? In this connection, the government acts as a private
trustee, with duties of loyalty and care to all of its citizens.
Taking this approach affords a sensible way in which to critique the wellknown Supreme Court decision in Illinois Central Railway Co. v. Illinois, which
involved a complex transaction whereby in 1869 the Illinois Central Railroad
received some land along the shore of Lake Michigan to build a new railway
depot and rights to 1000 acres of submerged lands for running its
operations.42 In exchange, the City received $800,000 in cash, commitments
from the Illinois Railroad that its operations would not interfere with
navigation along the lakefront, and restrictions on the rates that the Railroad
could charge for its operation as a common carrier. The initial grant was then
revoked by the Illinois legislature in 1873. That decision was sustained by
Justice Field on the ground that the title to the lakebed was held by Illinois in

40. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *264.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945). For the notable exception, see United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
42. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 389, 454 (1892). For a fuller statement of my
(earlier) position, see generally Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411
(1987). For an exhaustive discussion, see generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 799 (2004).
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public trust, which could “no more abdicate” the public trust than it could
relinquish control of its police powers.43
The purported parallel between the police power and the public trust
doctrine is fatally flawed. The former, which involves the monopoly of force
within the state, can never be transferred to private parties without incurring
the risk of chaos or worse. But the transfer to a private party imposes no such
peril if the deal makes sense on economic grounds. At this point the standard
principles of trust law, applicable to private trustees, never require that a
trustee keep all property that is entrusted to it. The usual view allows for
property to be transferred to private parties so long as fair value is received in
exchange. It is for that reason that governments are always allowed to sell off
surplus property, but not to give them away to friends without full
consideration in return. As applied to Illinois Central, it is clear therefore that
no absolute bar on alienability should be imposed on the state with respect to
lakebed property or indeed ordinary parkland. The ultimate inquiry should
have been into the fair value of what was received in return.
On this point, there is some reason to question whether Illinois did
receive full compensation for what was transferred. But the payment of direct
compensation to the state is not the sole measure of that question. What also
matters is the proper evaluation of the obligations that the Railroad incurred
to serve the public on receipt of the property. There is some reason to think
that the deal in question was too favorable to the Railroad,44 but the factintensive question of whether the valuation was correct only matters for the
resolution of that particular dispute. The larger issue is whether the total
prohibition on alienation should yield to a rule that allows, as I have argued,
for transfers when the state receives full and adequate consideration in return
under the constitutional rubric, “nor shall public property be transferred to
private use, without just compensation.”45 That principle can take into
account not only common carrier obligations, but also environmental ones,
which can be managed by imposing sensible covenants and restrictions on the
alienation of property that offers important environmental benefits.
The inability to handle the appropriate legal transformations also arose
with the use of navigable waters. As noted above, the control of navigation was
said to rest on the federal government. The initial foray into the system was
the Supreme Court decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, where the federal commerce
power allowed the United States to regulate navigation not only at the border
between two states, but also over river traffic as it extended into the interior

43. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453; see also Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879)
(“All agree that the legislature cannot bargain away the police power of a State.”).
44. For the strongest statement of the point, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489–91 (1969). For my
more cautious acquiescence, see Epstein, supra note 42, at 422–30.
45. Epstein, supra note 42, at 417.
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of each state.46 Over time, and without any serious justification, the federal
ability to regulate commerce was held to transfer to the federal government a
paramount navigation servitude sufficient to trump all private rights in
navigable waters, and to some extent, even in nonnavigable rivers. Henceforth
the federal government could, without compensation, wall off a river from
riparian owners,47 and, as in Willow River, destroy a mill by constructing a
downstream dam, thereby raising the tail waters,48 or take fast lands (above
the water) without compensating their owner for the loss of riparian rights on
the ground that “[w]e deal here with the federal domain, an area which
Congress can completely preempt, leaving no vested private claims that
constitute ‘private property’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”49
These transactions would never be blocked to private trustees, who have
broad powers of alienation over their trust property. The doctrine creates the
usual distortions on public policy. The displaced common law baselines were
intended to maximize the values that derived from the full set of correlative
property rights. As with the public trust doctrine, there is no reason why the
strong federal justifications for control over navigation should allow those
common law rights to be wiped out. Once that is done, the usual story follows:
excessive claims for federal water projects because the government need not
take into account the losses of private rights any longer.
This general view has spread, moreover, from water to land, most notably
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, which again shows the
weakness of property protection with respect to partial interests in land and,
in this instance, air rights, which may be recognized for private law purposes,
but which states can systematically disregard in their regulatory activities.50
The Supreme Court held that this argument failed because it was wrong to
posit that the law constituted “a ‘taking’ because its operation has significantly
diminished the value of the Terminal site,” when the zoning cases “uniformly
reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can
establish a ‘taking.’”51 But that position ignores the loss of air rights, and thus
acts as if the regulation in question only imposes competitive losses. In so
doing it ignores the critical difference between competition and the loss of
property rights. The former is associated with overall welfare improvements,
but the disregard of property rights is associated with overall social losses.52
The last episode of some note with water rights involves the creation of a
prior appropriation system in the American West, which operates on radically
46. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1 (1824).
47. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967).
48. See United States v. Willow River, 324 U.S. 499, 511 (1945).
49. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 227 (1956).
50. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
51. Id. at 131.
52. Id. at 142 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Appellees do not dispute that valuable property
rights have been destroyed.”).
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different principles from the riparian states in the East. As was recognized
from the earliest of times, a system of riparian rights does not work in the West
where rivers tend to be large and widely separated, and the land tends to be
arid. Often times riparian land can derive only limited benefit from the use
of water, while land located far away can benefit from extensive irrigation,
which can only be put in place by building out extensive works to transfer the
water, with high front-end costs. That difference in cost structure dictates in
large measure the preferred system of rights because no one will take the
position of a general creditor if required to make extensive front-end outlays
that can be eroded by later entrants. The situation therefore parallels the rise
of secured credit in land where a system of rigorous priorities enforced via a
registration system is the order of the day. Recordation is of course not
available in the state of nature, so the state must create a recordation
monopoly to make secured lending possible.
The situation with respect to water is even more complex because water
is a more difficult asset to manage. The system of priorities that is established
requires a state agency to determine the amount of unappropriated water
subject to appropriation that may be diverted from the river for some
beneficial use—itself an elastic concept that is intended to control against
hoarding by particular users.53 The appropriation systems require that the
amounts allowed to be removed be specified in advance, which requires
public officials to close some sluice gates and open others. This public
allocation function is intended not to displace standard property systems, but
instead to implement them. Indeed, the prior appropriation system is then
subject to further modifications intended to squeeze more water out of the
overall river system. Thus the doctrine of augmentation allows a person who
brings new unappropriated water to the river to claim a priority over existing
users to the extent of that addition. The situation is quite similar to the rules
whereby a lender who brings new capital to a failing venture is entitled to a
priority to the extent of that new contribution, which would otherwise not be
made at all. Owing to the high fluctuation in the amount of water that can
come down a particular river, the rules generally vary so that all priorities are
removed, and anyone can take water in flood conditions. Likewise, if water on
a river will not reach a downstream appropriator with a higher priority, the
upstream appropriator may take that water on the grounds that his out-ofsequence appropriation will not damage anyone else. All these actions can
only be determined under some comprehensive system of direct state
regulation, which in turn requires the creation of complex administrative
water boards and commissions to police the hierarchies and rights structure
so created.

53.

For the standard definition, see CHARLES J. MEYERS, NAT’L WATER COMM’N, U.S. DEP’T

OF COMMERCE, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPROPRIATION SYSTEM 4 (1971).
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The same result applies with respect to the transfer of water rights. In
general, appropriative rights are not necessarily tied to any parcel of land. So
while the easiest transfer systems move water with land on the same plot, it is
possible for separate alienation. But unlike the transfer of rights in land, the
externalities that can be created by these transfers are serious.54 This problem
can arise in multiple guises. Thus, the transferee may seek to divert the water
from a river at a different location from the transferor, and thus prejudice the
flow to persons with a higher priority. Or the transferor may seek to divide the
stream into two or more parts that could reduce the administrative strains on
the system. Or the transferee may seek to make an “enlargement” of the water
use relative to the transferor. In this context, there is no sensible regime of
free alienability, so that extensive administrative oversight is often required to
determine whether to allow—and if so, on what conditions—certain kinds of
property transfers, and only after the receipt and interpretation of expert
evidence on all disputed points.
There is, last of course, the same problem of legal transitions from older
to newer regimes, which raise takings issues similar to those with riparian
waters. On this score the most dramatic case by far is Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch
Co., an 1882 Colorado decision which found that the “imperative necessity”
to improve the utilization of water from the Colorado River justified
jettisoning the nascent English riparian system then in place in favor of a
robust prior appropriation system that grew up side-by-side with it.55 The
judicial decision that set aside the earlier property rights system was open to
strong challenge on takings grounds, given that these rights were “vested.”
But in this case, the Colorado court performed marvels of statutory
interpretation to essentially read the riparian rights system off the books and
anoint the prior appropriation system its successor. The case here is an
instance of what might be called Kaldor–Hicks constitutionalism,56 because in
effect the huge, perceived aggregate net gains from this system (which in itself
has major shortfalls) over the riparian systems was thought to overcome the
distributional difficulties in the case. In most situations of this sort, the
Kaldor–Hicks game is a high-risk operation, because when the relative gap
between gains and losses starts to shift, the factional political activities
necessarily start to increase, resulting in major social losses from all the
familiar causes. Thus, in subsequent iterations, one serious problem is the
strong and correct perception that it is no longer possible to maintain
separate systems for (under)ground water and surface waters, given the
interactions between them.

54. See, e.g., Barron v. Idaho Dept. of Water Res., 18 P.3d 219, 223 (Idaho 2001).
55. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 450 (1882). For an extensive discussion, see
generally DAVID SCHORR, THE COLORADO DOCTRINE: WATER RIGHTS, CORPORATIONS, AND
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (2012).
56. For a further discussion, see generally Epstein, supra note 14.
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The connection will, in most cases, require some retreat from the rule of
capture as it applies to underground water under the venerable 1843 rule in
Acton v. Blundell, which treats all forms of subsidence by neighbors as a form
of damnum absque injuria, or harm without legal injury.57 The rule was
eventually qualified, so that the removal of water (like the digging out of land)
that caused subsidence became actionable at the suit of a neighbor58 and the
malicious removal of water, narrowly defined as “for the sole purpose of
injuring [a] neighbor,” became actionable.59 These rules are similar to the
parallel restrictions placed on withdrawing oil and gas from common pools
before unitization. In the end this system gave way to a reasonable-user
regime, which, along with the overall increases in output, did much to blunt
the possibility of any takings claim.60
That said, it hardly follows that all such transitions produce the kinds of
overall net gains that immunize them from takings claims. For example, in
some instances, groundwater claims are subject to priorities similar to those
for surface water. In some instances, both groundwater and surface water
develop under prior appropriation systems (whose advantages are less clear
for groundwater).61 In these instances, it seems wrong to subordinate all
groundwater claims to all surface claims, regardless of their date of priority,
when both systems purport to create vested rights. Linking them through a
single priority listing may be better in cases where the substantial value of both
sets of claims within well-established legal order reduces the attractiveness of
the Kaldor–Hicks constitutionalism used in Coffin. Nonetheless, the Colorado
court denied the claim, taking the view that the usufructuary rights in water
meant that the holders of these claims “do[] not ‘own’ water but own[] the
right to use water within the limitations of the prior appropriation [system].”62
The difficulty with this argument is that it denigrates the value of partial
interests in natural resources. The so-called usufructuary interest of the
groundwater owners is a property interest that can be sold and mortgaged.
There is no reason why, like the profit-interest in taking oil and gas from the
surface, this interest should be subject to lesser protection when the uniform
priority system could apply to both. Indeed, the weak level of property
protection will, as usual, only intensify the factional tensions. There is no
question that the state can choose whether to create these priority systems.
But once they are created, the rights within them should be fully vested to the
same extent as the prior appropriation rights to the surface water. Here is yet

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (1843).
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978).
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1955).
See Meeker v. City of East Orange, 74 A. 379, 385 (N.J. 1909).
See generally Kobobel v. State, Dep’t. of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127 (Colo. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 1134.
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another instance in which the transition of legal regimes provokes a valid
constitutional response.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay is to explain both the uses and limitations of
the natural rights system to allow for the prepolitical or spontaneous creation
of property rights without the explicit intervention of the state. Those systems
can do much useful work with simple rules that govern priority and sharing,
so long as they are matched to the right type of regime—as a first
approximation, exclusivity through capture for land, chattels, and animals—
and to an open access regime for water. But as use levels become more intense
or as physical settings change, the limitations of a natural law system become
more apparent, which calls for purposive legislation that can, if properly
executed, generate substantial social gains.
At this point, it is important not to buy into the Hayekian story that all
spontaneous orders are good and all planned orders are bad. There is little
doubt that with respect to many key resources, the introduction of systems of
regulation to thwart common pool problems of overuse with respect to fish,
wildlife, oil and gas, and water were not met with determined opposition by
those who had an undying attachment to common law rules. Instead, the
situations were such that in many situations a sensible case for central
planning allowed for the introduction of new regimes that produced not only
aggregate gains over the prior common law systems, but also distributed those
relatively evenly across participants in the overall system. The reason for this
success was that the parties who put these schemes into place, whether by
common law decision, legislation, or administrative action, did not suffer
from either the fatal conceit in their abilities to plan or enormous ignorance
over the consequences of their innovation. These systems were localized
interventions in response to widely perceived problems that no one could
ignore—the extinction of fish and animals, the exhaustion of oil and gas, the
drying up of rivers and wells—that called for some concerted social response.
Many of the rules in question performed their job well.
This narrative is, of course, not one that calls for uniform optimism,
because legal transitions always create risks that are sometimes
underappreciated by courts. Hence, side-by-side with the successful
introduction of various control systems is a set of judicial decisions on takings
that goes astray because it does not seek to identify those systems that produce,
roughly speaking, Pareto improvements, but instead decides cases on the view
that central planners should be allowed to operate free of the constraints that
the Takings Clause might otherwise impose—in line with today’s progressive
mindset that expert administrators can faithfully implement new regulatory
schemes almost as a matter of course. That system works no better with water
rights than with anything else. Instead, the correct balance has a three-fold
logic. First, it seeks to recognize and foster systems of customary rights that
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generate overall social gains. Next, it allows for legislative changes to cut down
on the problems that arise from new levels of intensive use. And finally, it uses
the Takings Clause to see that the decline of customary rights does not
produce massive shifts in wealth that could undermine the gains obtainable
by sensible legislative and administrative action. No system of spontaneous
evolution can cover the entire waterfront of property rights. But the legislative
changes should work systematically to preserve the strong points of these
customary systems while weeding out their systematic weaknesses.

